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Female parliamentarians and economic growth: Evidence from a large panel 
1. Introduction 
Globally, less than one in five seats in national parliaments are held by women (World 
Bank, 2012). Increasing the number of female legislators is a key outcome of Millennium 
Development Goal 3 (“Promote gender equality and empower women”). This article 
uses data for 119 democracies for the period 1970-2009 to explore whether female 
representation in parliament affects the economic growth rate. 
There is evidence that gender inequality in education reduces economic growth (Klasen 
2002) and that female parliamentary representation reduces corruption (Dollar et al 
2001, Swamy et al 2001). Economies with better-educated leaders tend to grow faster 
(Besley et al 2011). Women are typically recognized as better microfinance managers 
(Khandker 2005). However, the effect of female parliamentarians on the national 
economic growth rate is yet to be examined. 
We present estimates using both the fixed-effects estimator and the system Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998). System GMM allows consistent estimation of the causal effect of female 
parliamentary representation on economic growth in the presence of endogenous 
explanatory variables. 
2. Approach 
The following growth model is estimated: 
, , 1 1 , 1 2 , , ,100( )        i t i t i t i t i t i t i tY Y Y W    X β     (1) 
where Y is the logarithm of real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in country i in 
year t, W is the proportion of women in parliament, X includes additional determinants 
of economic growth, βi and βt are country and year fixed effects, and ε is a residual. 
,( ) 0i tE  for all i and t. The dependent variable is multiplied by 100 to reduce 
coefficient decimal places. βi allows us to control for country-specific factors which may 
affect both parliamentary representation and the economy. 
  
 
 
 
2 
For robustness purposes, we present results using GDP data from both the Penn World 
Table (Heston et al 2011) and the World Bank (2012). The share of parliamentarians 
who are female is obtained from Paxton et al (2008) and the World Bank (2012), and is 
for the lower house of bicameral parliaments (and the sole house of unicameral 
parliaments). X includes standard growth determinants: the primary school enrolment 
rate, trade and investment (both as shares of GDP), and the population growth rate. We 
also present estimates that control for the ratio of the female and male primary school 
enrolment rates. Data for controls are from Heston et al (2011) and the World Bank 
(2012). Countries are only included in estimations if they are classed by Cheibub et al 
(2010) as democracies at the start of period t. Our (unbalanced) estimation sample is as 
large as data allow. 
Equation (1) is initially estimated with a fixed effects estimator on annual data. Yet the 
inclusion of lagged log GDP per capita means that we should be concerned that these 
estimates are not consistent. We employ system GMM to address the endogeneity of 
lagged log GDP per capita and the potential endogeneity of the other explanatory 
variables, including W. System GMM involves joint estimation in levels and differences, 
employing differences as instruments in the levels equation and lagged levels as 
instruments in the differences equation. This estimator removes country fixed effects 
and is suited to relatively short panels. Accordingly, we use 13 three-year averages for 
the system GMM estimations, utilizing periods from 1970-1972 to 2006-2008.  
Our system GMM estimations consider all variables other than population growth and 
the year dummies to be endogenous.1 Following Roodman (2009b), we restrict the 
instruments to one lag and use a collapsed instrument matrix to reduce instrument 
proliferation. We use two-step estimation with the Windmeijer (2005) small sample 
robust correction to avoid downwardly-biased standard errors. 
3. Results 
Fixed effects results using annual data are in Table 1. Estimates for 1970-2009 are in 
columns 1 and 4, and provide no significant evidence that the female share of 
                                               
 
1 We use the xtabond2 command of Roodman (2009a). 
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parliament affects economic growth. Results on the control variables are generally of 
the expected signs. 
Results estimated after restricting the sample to 1993-2009, the period subsequent to 
the peak of the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991), are reported in 
columns 2 and 5 of Table 1. We find significant positive estimates of the impact of the 
proportion of women on economic growth for this more recent period. 
Table 2 presents system GMM results using three-year averaged data for both the full 
period and the more recent years. The results identify a positive effect of female 
parliamentary representation on economic growth, and one that is significant at the 5% 
level (except in column 4). The coefficients in columns 2 and 5 suggest that, holding the 
other variables constant, each percentage point of female parliamentary representation 
on average increases annual per-capita economic growth by around 0.16 percentage 
points. Larger estimates are obtained in columns 3 and 6 (for the period since the early 
1990s). 
Our Table 2 estimates fail to reject the null of the Hansen J test (Hansen 1982) that the 
overidentifying restrictions are valid (except for column 4). The null of the difference-
in-Hansen test is also not rejected (except in column 4). We do not observe overly-high 
Hansen J test p-values, suggesting that bias from over-instrumenting has likely been 
avoided.2 The Arellano and Bond (1991) tests generally identify high first-order 
autocorrelation and do not provide evidence of second-order autocorrelation. 
Altogether, the test statistics point to satisfactory system GMM specifications.3 
We share the concern of Sung (2003) that β2 might represent the benefit of fairer 
societies (in which more women enter parliament) rather than the marginal effect of 
women in parliament on the economy. To address this we include a key measure of 
gender equality – the ratio of the female and male primary school enrolment rates – in 
Tables 1 and 2; the estimated impact of women in parliament on economic growth 
                                               
 
2 In unreported specifications using additional instrument lags and uncollapsed instruments we observe 
high Hansen J test p-values – a symptom of over-instrumenting (Roodman 2009b). 
3 The regressions in columns 1, 5 and 6 of Table 2 are the best specified as the Hansen J test values are 
insignificant and there is AR(1) but not AR(2) in first differences. 
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remains positive and significant in all cases. In unreported specifications4, we continue 
to find a significant impact of female parliamentary representation on economic growth 
after controlling for the timing of legislative elections. We find no evidence that the 
gender of a country’s President or Prime Minister affects economic growth. 
4. Conclusion 
Both fixed effects and system GMM estimations for a large sample of democracies 
suggest that, over recent decades, higher representation of females in parliament has 
led to faster economic growth. The results provide some evidence that empowering 
women is an important means toward economic development. Countries in the Pacific 
and the Middle East currently have the lowest shares of females in parliament and 
therefore likely have the most to gain from improving the gender balances of their 
parliaments. The most appropriate mechanism for increasing the representativeness of 
national parliaments is a contentious issue, and one for which our estimations do not 
shed light. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
4 Available on request. 
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Table 1. Fixed effects results (annual panel) 
 
Dependent Variable: 100*(Ln GDP per capitat-Ln GDP per capitat-1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Data WB WB WB PWT PWT PWT 
Years All years 1993+ 1993+ All years 1993+ 1993+ 
Seats held by women in national parliament 
(%)t 
0.010 0.093*** 0.103*** -0.022 0.067* 0.071* 
(0.026) (0.034) (0.035) (0.026) (0.038) (0.037) 
Ln GDP per capitat-1 -
7.124*** 
-
10.091*** 
-
10.884*** 
-
7.488*** 
-
12.063*** 
-
11.909*** 
(1.330) (2.410) (2.435) (1.186) (2.609) (2.615) 
School enrolment rate, primary (% gross)t 0.014 0.017 0.010 -0.015 0.001 -0.014 
(0.019) (0.024) (0.028) (0.020) (0.029) (0.029) 
Trade (% of GDP)t 0.031** 0.002 0.003 0.021* -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.020) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) 
Investment (% of GDP)t 0.128*** 0.195*** 0.218*** 0.175*** 0.249*** 0.277*** 
 (0.037) (0.050) (0.052) (0.037) (0.046) (0.046) 
Population growth ratet -0.778** -1.132*** -1.158*** -0.434 -0.673 -0.864** 
 (0.330) (0.374) (0.348) (0.410) (0.420) (0.421) 
Ratio: Female/male primary gross school 
enrolment ratet 
  0.001   -0.034 
    (0.041)     (0.049) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) 0.25 0.32 0.34 0.21 0.26 0.29 
Countries 117 115 114 119 116 115 
Observations 2,373 1,436 1,395 2,414 1,443 1,402 
Notes: WB: World Bank (2012). PWT: Penn World Table. Years in full sample: 1970-2009. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The R-
squared includes the explanatory power of the year dummies. ***, ***, *: Significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
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Table 2. System GMM results (three-year panel) 
 
Dependent Variable: 100*(Ln GDP per capitat-Ln GDP per capitat-1) 
Data WB WB WB PWT PWT PWT 
Years All years All years 1993+ All years All years 1993+ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Seats held by women in 
national parliament (%)t 
0.589** 0.518** 0.724** 0.468 0.485** 0.658** 
(0.281) (0.243) (0.348) (0.307) (0.237) (0.308) 
Ln GDP per capitat-1 -4.297 -3.371 -3.677 -5.465 -1.582 -1.440 
(3.588) (2.877) (3.806) (3.593) (2.827) (3.530) 
School enrolment rate, 
primary (% gross)t 
0.204 0.603** 0.485 1.048 0.456 0.390 
(1.358) (0.248) (0.331) (0.673) (0.323) (0.354) 
Trade (% of GDP)t -0.043 -0.013 0.002 0.017 -0.035 0.003 
 (0.119) (0.085) (0.119) (0.148) (0.105) (0.116) 
Investment (% of GDP)t 1.708*** 1.543*** 1.850*** 1.291*** 1.183*** 1.234*** 
 (0.346) (0.331) (0.463) (0.430) (0.337) (0.451) 
Population growth ratet -1.162* -
1.321*** 
-1.375** -0.966* -0.847* -1.034* 
 (0.615) (0.408) (0.594) (0.560) (0.436) (0.575) 
Ratio: Female/male primary 
gross school enrolment ratet 
 -0.620 -0.696  -0.602 -0.850 
  (0.675) (0.824)   (0.490) (0.661) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hansen J test p-value 0.16 0.48 0.39 0.07 0.24 0.39 
Arellano-Bond test: first-
order autocorrelation  
0.03 0.21 0.61 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Arellano-Bond test: second-
order autocorrelation  
0.53 0.60 0.45 0.78 0.24 0.65 
Instruments 24 26 20 24 26 20 
Countries 105 104 103 106 105 104 
Observations 641 582 395 653 592 397 
Notes: WB: World Bank. PWT: Penn World Table. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Explanatory variables 
other than population growth and the year dummies are treated as endogenous. Estimation is two-step and uses the 
Windmeijer (2005) correction. A collapsed matrix of first-lag instruments is used. The Arellano-Bond tests are for the 
difference equations. Growth variables represent growth over a three-year period. With the exception of lagged ln GDP 
per capita, the other variables are three-year averages. The "1993+" sample uses three-year intervals from 1991-1993 to 
2006-2008. ***, ***, *: Significant at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
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